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In deciding to invade Kuwa& Saddam evaluated his options agamst a matnx of ex$ng regonal power arrangements and his assessment of Kuwat's ablhty to call upon I others for support Based on ths llrmted framework, Kuwait appeared to be an easy mark Sad4 am's mistake was m not understandmg the extent to which the mtematlonal community would assess his action as not Just a threat to a Gulf emirate, but as a threat broader I inte+ational econonnc interests, requlnng a unified mtematronal response Saddam's anal&s of potential rntematlonal reaction was faulty, but his more cntlcal error was m not hahlrig available a plan that would have permitted him to stand down from the threat of / mLa4lon while glvmg the appearance of a "tim" to the Iraq1 populatron 
